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SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Capstar argues that while the Lawrences did cite the correct authority regarding summary
judgment, that authority seemingly ignores the posture of the case. Citing Intermountain Forest
Management v. Louisiana Pacific, Capstar goes on to argue that the trial court is entitled to arrive
at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence and to grant summary
judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. In support of this argument, Capstar
seemingly inserts itself in the mind of the trial court and attempts to explain all the inferences the
trial court made in reaching its decision. Capstar's argument as to what inferences the trial court
may have made is nothing more than mere conjecture and speculation and is totally irrelevant
regarding the issue of whether or not summary judgment was proper. Capstar simply is not in a
position to argue how the trial court arrived at its decision, unless and only unless, the trial court
provided some explanation in its written decision.
Where Capstar errors in its interpretation and application of Intermountain to the present
case, is that the facts as offered by Capstar are being aggressively disputed. If the Lawrences had
failed to produce rebuttal evidence of any kind, then the trail court may have been correct to
draw probable inferences from the Rook and Funk affidavits. But that is not what we have in this
case. The Lawrences deposed both Rook and Funk, offered conflicting affidavits from Bruce
Anderson, Wilber Mead, and others, and submitted court rulings, maps, county records, and
business records, all in an effort to defeat the affidavits authored by Capstar's legal team and sent
to Funk and Rook to sign. The trial court simply abused its discretion in its summary judgment
ruling.
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THE EVIDENTIARY ERRORS
The Appellant's opening brief remunerated twenty-four evidentiary errors made by the
trial court which in its reply brief, Capstar characterizes as either harmless scrivener errors,
"probable inferences", and/or irrelevant. The issue is, that the overwhelming majority of these
errors cannot be dismissed as either harmless scrivener's errors or probable inferences. The fact
of the matter is, the trial court simply did not get its evidentiary facts correct and the Lawrences
were denied their due process rights. And, regardless of how Capstar may want to portray these
errors, under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves,
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872

P2d 708, 716 (1994).
Because this is not the first time the Lawrences are appearing on appeal in this matter, it
is entirely fair to say that the trial court has a record of making error(s). And, it needs to be noted,
that while the Lawrences prevailed on an earlier appeal, the reversal of that summary judgment
didn't erase the trail court's earlier errors, it just corrected the judgment. Those earlier errors are
entirely relevant to the "whole body" of errors produced by the trial court in this matter.
Especially, given the fact that both sets of errors, those noted on the first appeal, and those noted
in the present appeal, included among other things, the trial court's interpretation of the subject to
and including language of Funk/Human Sale Agreement (which is addressed at some length later
in this brief), both sets of errors resulted in summary judgment rulings declaring the existence of
easements in favor of the Respondents. Listed below are just a few of the errors made by the trial
court:
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•

A finding that the very same deed that was found to be ambiguous in the Tower case was
repeatedly found to be clear and unambiguous in the Capstar proceeding, is not a
harmless error, but a fundamental error.

•

A finding that the subject to and including language in the Funk/Human sale agreement
was "unambiguous" and that such language created an express easement in favor of
Cap star, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. [R. 32090 p.83]

•

A finding that Funk took great care to reserve an easement across the parcel sold to
Human Synergistics in 1975; however, he errantly put that language in the Sale
Agreement, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error.

•

A finding that the reason there is no express easement is the most convincing evidence as
to the implied easement theory, is not a harmless scrivener's error.

•

A finding that the Rebeor's affidavit shows that he managed the tower site for Capstar,

IS

not a harmless error, but a fundamental error.
•

A finding that Nextel assigned the Access License Agreement to Capstar, is not a
harmless error, but a fundamental error.

•

A finding that Funk used the property consistently from the six year period from the day
he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the area, is not a harmless error,
but a fundamental error.

•

A finding that the use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funk made of
the Lawrences' land, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error.
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•

A finding that when Funk sold the Section 21 parcel to Human Synergistics, Funk
included in the sales contract language that gave notice that Funk intended to continue to
use the road for ingress/egress, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error.

•

A finding that the Funks and their successors used the road openly, continuously, without
interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the statutory period requires, is
not a harmless error, but a fundamental error.

Capstar is simply wrong to characterize the errors the trial court made as either harmless
scriveners errors or "probable inferences" within the trial court's prerogative to make.
Capstar also identified items F, J, K, L, M, N, 0, P, Q, R, and S in the Appellant's opening
brief as issues Capstar considers irrelevant to the present appeal. Capstar suggests that all are
statements made by the trail court regarding the Tower Asset Litigation. And, because of that,
this Court should disregard them. Capstar certainly doesn't offer any explanation as to why each
and everyone is irrelevant, nor do they cite any case law in support. Neither have they offered
any legal foundation establishing why Appellants cannot point to ALL the trial court errors in it's
written decision they are appealing to a higher Court to review.
The Lawrences did not ask the trial court to offer one opinion for both cases. And, had the
trial court offered two separate written decisions, Capstar MIGHT have a valid argument. The
problem for Capstar is that they (both Capstar and Tower) intended that both of these cases be
tried on the same path. It was a conscious decision on their partes). Capstar and Tower both hire
the same attorney. Both cases happened to be assigned to the same judge. Both, file motions for
summary judgments at or near the same time. Both schedule nearly all hearings and court
appearances together. Both submit practically the same briefs. And, in just about every case, their
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briefs were filed together at the same time. Both agreed that one deposition of Harold Funk be
taken and that deposition be used for both cases. At no time, over the past nine years, has Capstar
ever objected to the trial court issuance of one written decision to cover both cases.
These two cases are conjoined in other ways. At the first summary judgment hearing in
Capstar, the Lawrences moved the court for an extension of time to complete their discovery.
Rather, than grant the extension of time for discovery, the trial court held a summary judgment
hearing (limited to the express easement theory) and simply withheld its ruling until after a
summary judgment hearing was held in the Tower case. Similar to Capstar, Tower also pursued a
summary judgment ruling on ALL its easement theories as well. Facing a summary judgment
hearing in Tower, the Lawrences abandoned their Pro Se status and retained legal representation.
After filing a notice of appearance, the Lawrences' attorney filed for an extension to complete
discovery. The trial court granted the extension, but then gave orders that the Tower discovery
and summary judgment argument be limited also to the express easement theory alone. The trial
court offered no explanation as to why the Tower discovery should be limited. If, as Capstar
argues, the facts and proceedings in Tower are totally irrelevant to Capstar, then the trial court
would have no apparent reason to limit the discovery (and argument) in Tower to the express
easement theory alone. Capstar certainly didn't raise any objection to the trial court's apparent
"conjoining" of the two cases then.
The fact of the matter is, that for eight years Capstar and Tower have prosecuted these
two cases very similarly and on the same calendar. They did it most likely to help keep their
expenses down and the Appellants costs up. There can be no doubt, that defending two cases is
certainly more expensive and time consuming than defending only one.
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In the present matter, the Appellants are appealing from orders the trial court published
on June 25, 2007 which is a joint Memorandum decision and order denying motion to

disqualify for cause, 1.R.p.e 40 (d)(2), a November 30, 2007 joint Memorandum decision
and order denying defendant's renewed motion for permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order, I.A.R. 12, and the February 6, 2008 joint written decision Memorandum
decision and order granting plaintiff's motion for summary jUdgment. All three orders were
jointly published. Had Capstar taken issue with the joint publication of these orders, Capstar
should have made an objection with the trial court at the appropriate time. However, Capstar
made no such objection and cannot now argue that this Court should not consider the trial court's
written decision in its entirety.
It is also abundantly clear from the trial court's written decision that the trial court

considered evidence and arguments from both cases in reaching its decision(s) for both. For
example, item F, which Capstar argues is irrelevant, revolves around evidence submitted in
Tower which the trial court relied on in ruling in favor of Capstar. Here, the trial court made the
finding that on January 13,2003, Nextel assigned the access license agreement to Capstar. It is
completely unclear how the trial court could arrive at such a finding since there was never any
assignment of the Nextel License Agreement to Capstar. Regardless, it is an error in a finding of
fact as it applies to Capstar and therefore, makes the error and the Tower record entirely relevant
for review by this Court.
The Appellants believe that the trial court simply "lumped" these two cases together in its
findings of facts, decisions, and judgment making processes. This idea is supported by a couple
of statements the trial court offered in its decision: "Additionally, the analysis above as to

-9-

Capstar's easement by implication from prior use, easement by necessity and easement by
prescription, applies to the Halls [R. 35120 v. 3 p. 589] ... Just as in the Capstar case,
Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the arguments ofstatute of limitations and
laches ... The analysis above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case [R. 35120 v.3
p.590].
Lastly, there can be no doubt that the trial court made its findings in Tower entirely
relevant to Capstar, when it published a joint written decision; and, that written decision became
a part of the clerks record on appeal. Had the trial court believed the facts and issues in each case
were irrelevant to the other case, then the trial court would have and should have exercised due
care not to taint each by the other. Clearly, that is not what has happened in this case. By
publishing joint decisions and joint findings of fact, the trial court simply made each case
relevant to the other. All the trial court errors noted in the Appellants' opening brief are relevant
to Capstar because the trail court made them a part of the Capstar record which is up for review.

THE ISSUE OF NECESSITY
Exhibit 1 is a scanned image of page 20 of Capstar's Respondent's Brief (Docket
#35120) containing a map that Capstar argues is an illustrative depiction of the properties in
question utilizing a Kootenai County public road map from the Brownsberger affidavit. Capstar
states that the properties Funks originally acquired are highlighted in yellow and the red x's on
the map illustrate the approximate location of Mellick Road. Capstar makes the claim that this
map is evidence that the logging road across the Funk parcel did not extend all the way to
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Mellick and that Mellick Road crosses into Section 21 and does not provide access to his land in
Section 22.
Notwithstanding the fact the Lawrences raise issue with the foundation and accuracy of
the map, even this map clearly shows Mellick road entering Funk's land in Government Lot 3,
the SW 1;4 of the SW 1;4 of Section 15.
During the presentation of oral argument on April 6 2010, this Court questioned Capstar's
attorney specifically regarding the Mellick Road access to Funk's land in Section 15. The
following verbal discourse was exchanged between Justice Horton and Ms. Weeks during oral
argument.

Justice Horton:

"ff we're focusing on the Funk parcel,

then wasn't their access to their

parcel in Section 15 via Mellick Road? "

Ms. Weeks: "Your honor, I know that the little map I drew, the red, touches that corner
but the Mellick road survey and I believe ifyou look at the one that Judge Haman put in there
does not take it in other than to that one corner. Yes. But it didn't continue on in. There wasn't a
road on in. He would have had to have created the road in to there and Mr. Rook, testified ... or
excuse me not Mr. Rook, Mr. Funk testified that that the terrain was such that it wasn't a
reasonable option. But, yes, I do think that ifyou look at those that it may have touched the
corner ofSection 15 ofpart ofhis ownership. "

Justice Horton: "Which is basically all that is requiredfor an easement by necessity, is
that the parcel actually be accessible, not that all portions of the parcel be readily accessible. "

Ms. Weeks: "That's correct."
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Clearly, Ms. Weeks acknowledged to this Court that Funk's access in Section 15 was via
Mellick Road. Furthermore, Ms. Weeks agreed with Justice Horton that all that is required is that
the parcel is accessible and not all portions of the parcel be accessible. Yet, Capstar's reply brief
appears to be a reversal from Ms. Week's acknowledgments to this Court. Capstar's reply brief is
largely are-hash of the same false claim i.e. "At the time Funks purchased the property in 1969,
the GTC easement road was the only existing road providing access to the Funk's real property."
The undeniable fact is that Mellick Road provided legal access to the Funk parcel in
Section 15. This fact is proven by no less than the 1907 Survey and Viewers Report, the Bruce
Anderson affidavit, the 1959 Metsker map, the District Court's finding in the Loudin v. Stokes
case, the Brownsberger map, Funk's deposition testimony, and Ms. Weeks own testimony to this
Court. It clearly goes against statements contained in the Funk and Rook affidavits stating
otherwise and does raise the question regarding the reliability of those affidavits.
Both easement theories, an easement by necessity and easement implied by prior use,
require that the claimant "prove" (among other things) the element of necessity. For an easement
by necessity, the claimant must prove strict necessity; generally meaning that the parcel is
completely devoid any legal access. Given the undeniable fact that Funk's land in Section 15
benefited from the Mellick Road access, this element cannot be established and Capstar's claim
of an easement by necessity is defeated.

IMPLIED BY PRIOR USE
For an easement implied by prior use, the claimant need not prove strict necessity.
Rather, the claimant only needs to prove something less than strict necessity; generally meaning
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that acquiring the access would prove either too costly or too difficult. Here too, because Funk's
land benefited from the Mellick road easement in Section 15, there is no necessity. Simply stated,
Capstar cannot establish an easement implied by prior use because it cannot establish the element
of necessity. The Funk parcel benefited from the Mellick road easement and therefore, there was
no element of necessity.
Capstar attempts to make the argument that because Mellick road didn't extend all the
way into Funks' Section 22 property or because it needed work, created a necessity for access to
Funk's Section 22 land. This argument is clearly unsupported by law. Capstar has failed to cite
any case law that supports the argument that anyone who cannot access a part of their land, can
take the property of their neighbor for access. There simply is no law that provides that every
portion of a parcel must have legal access.
Regardless, the undeniable fact is that there was a logging road that extended from
Mellick road in Section 15 to Funks land in Section 22. Whether or not that road had become
overgrown or had passed through Section 21 is clearly irrelevant. Theoretically, even if the
owner of Section 21 denied Mr. Funk the right to travel on the logging road as it passed through
Section 21, Mr. Funk could have redirected the road to connect up with Mellick road in his
Section 15 property. There was nothing that stopped him other than the desire to do it.
Capstar's argument that the terrain was too steep or too difficult for Mr. Funk to improve
is unsupported by the evidence and completely without merit. To the contrary, Mr. Mack testifies
in his affidavit that he improved the old logging road. It certainly did not appear to be too
difficult or prove to be too costly for him. One has to ask, if Mr. Mack didn't have any trouble
cleaning out the old logging road, then why would it be too difficult for Mr. Funk?
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It is undeniable that the logging road did extend from Funk's land in Section 15 to Funk's

land in Section 22. This fact is supported by Mr. Funk's deposition testimony, the Metsker map,
and the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and John Mack. The fact that Mr. Funk elected not to
clean or maintain the logging road is supported by Mr. Funk's own deposition testimony. Mr.
Funk cannot create a necessity for his land in Section 22 by electing not to clean and improve his
Mellick road access. The law in Idaho is clear. "Owner of property cannot create a necessity for
an easement by his or her own actions". B & J Development and Inv., Inc. v Parsons, 126 Idaho
504,887 P2d 49 Rehearing Denied (1994).
Capstar has other problems with their easement implied by prior use claim. First, the
easement Capstar claims to have existed in 1975 didn't exist. Prior to 1989, the Capstar parcel
was just part of the larger tract ofland the Funks owned. There simply was no access road to the
Capstar parcel. In 1975, there was only an access road to the Funk parcel.
As Mr. Funk testifies, he did not approach the owners of Section 28 for an easement.
According to Mr. Funk, the twenty or thirty times when he drove to his land, he typically did not
drive across Section 28. Rather, he drove to a spot (that he identified on a map used at his
deposition) that was west of the Lawrences' parcel and did not require passing through Section
28. There can be no doubt that the Funks did use "a portion" of the Apple Blossom Road to
access their property to the west of the Lawrence parcel. However, the Funks certainly did not
make use of the Lawrence parcel as Capstar suggests.
There can also be no doubt that the Funks only made two or three trips to their property
after 1975 and absolutely no trips after 1981, some eight years prior to the creation of the Capstar
parcel. Two or three trips over a six year (1975-1981) period across wild, uninhabited and open
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forest land, and unbeknownst to anyone but themselves, hardly rises to the legal definition of an
implied prior use. Mr. Funk claims that from 1969 to 1975 he made twenty to thirty trips to his
property across the land owned by Wilber Mead. In an affidavit offered by Wilber Mead, Mr.
Mead states that prior to granting the Funks an easement in 1972, the only people he was aware
of using his road was GTE. If Mr. Mead wasn't aware of the use the Funks made of his land prior
to 1972, then how would anyone else be aware of the Funks' two or three trips made over a six
year period. There is simply no evidence that anyone, other than the Funks themselves, even
knew of such use. Even Rook testifies that he didn't know what road Funk used.
Prior to 1975, the Funks used the Apple Blossom Road to access a point to the west of the
Lawrence parcel. After the Funks move to American Falls in 1975, for all practical purposes, the
Funks use of the Apple Blossom access road terminates. The only established use that the Funks
made of the Apple Blossom Road is the use they made of the road between the period of 1972
and 1975 to reach an area that Mr. Funk identified on a map that lays to the west of the Lawrence
parcel.
It also needs to be noted that at all times relevant, the Funks were in legal title to all their

lands in Sections 15, 21 and 22. In order for Capstar to establish the element of necessity they
claim to have existed in Funks' Section 22 parcel, Capstar would have to establish that the Funks
conveyed title ownership of the Lawrence parcel in 1975. That simply did not happen.

FUNK/HUMAN SYNERGISTICS SALE AGREEMENT
Capstar asserts that the trial court correctly noted that after Funk sold the property to
Human Synergistics in 1975, he recorded a sales agreement which contained the clause that the
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parcel was subject to an ingress/egress easement for the benefit of Section 22. And, even though
this language did not reserve an express easement, it evidenced a claim of right for Funk and
their successors to use the road for ingress and egress to Section 22.
The Funk/Human Synergistics land sale agreement was neither a conveyance or any
claim of rights by its own terms. The Sale Agreement was merely an executory land sale
agreement to place third parties on notice that the Buyer has a beneficial interest in the land. In

Capstar v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P3d 575 (2007), this Court agreed:
"This was a title retaining contract where the grant of the Lawrence parcel (and creation
of any easement over it) was contingent upon the fulfillment of the sales agreement. The
document does not disclose any intent to convey any property interest until the balance owning
on the sales agreement was paid."

Being that the sales agreement was not a conveyance as Capstar claims, the Funks
retained title ownership in the property until they actually conveyed the title in 1992. Therefore,
whatever use Capstar claims the Funks made of the Lawrence property prior to 1992, could not
be considered a prescriptive use. One simply cannot create a prescriptive use over the lands they
own. The trial court was in error when it ruled that: "The use Capstar seeks is no different than
the prescriptive use Funks made of the Lawrences' land for that six year period from 1969 to
1975." [R. 35120 v. 3 p. 575]
Capstar initially claimed that the "subject to and including language" of the Sales
Agreement amounted to a reservation of an easement. And, this was the finding of the trial court
on our first appeal [R. 32090 p.83]. This Court simply disagreed with trial court's finding
concluding:
"There is nothing in the sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of
easement rights ... The sale agreement therefore does not, by itself, create any
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easement either by grant, reservation or exception. The district court erred in
concluding that it did."

Either the trial court did not read this decision or it simply disagreed with the
Supreme Court's opinion. The trial court made it obviously clear, it thought otherwise:

"Funks actually did take great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he
sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; however, they errantly put that language in
the sale agreement. That is why there is no express easement." [R. 35120 v. 3 p.
569]

The undeniable fact is that the subject to and including language in the sales agreement
was simply declaring that the parcel being sold was subject to an easement that had been
previously granted to GTE in 1966 and it also included an easement (appurtenant) that the Funks
acquired across the property owned by Wilber Mead in 1972. This fact was supported by the
1998 writing Harold Funk offered by the Lawrences, as well as the 1966 GTE warranty deed, the
1972 Mead/Funk easement, and the 2007 Supreme Court opinion in Capstar.
After this Court remanded this case back in 2007, Capstar invents a new argument for the
sales agreement; claiming that while the language did not reserve an easement, it did evidence a
claim of right for Funk and their successors to use the road for ingress and egress to Section 22.
This argument is simply disingenuous and without merit. It was a product created to fill a void in
their prescriptive easement claim. The void that involves the element of notice. Capstar simply
has not produced any evidence that supports the notice element that's required for a prescriptive
easement claim. Because there is no evidence, they attempted to invent it. Capstar never really
explains how the language creates a claim or points to the exact wording that creates the claim.
They just suggest that it does and the trial court was ever too eager to go along.
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FARMANIANIMACK EASEMENT
Capstar argues that Lawrences' predecessor in title "Farmanian," immediately prior to
signing the Lawrence sale agreement, entered into a grant of easement and quit claim deed with
John Mack. As Capstar argues, in that writing, Farmanian and Mack recognizes the GTC
easement road (as it crosses the Farmanian parcel) as the historical access road being used by
Funk and his successor Mack. However, Capstar offers no other evidence of any kind to support
this claim, nothing from the Farmanians and nothing from Mack. And, as the record abundantly
shows, the Farmanians would have absolutely no first hand knowledge of the Funks use of the
road.
The Farmanians' interest in the Lawrence parcel begins on June 28, 1996 when National
Associated Properties conveys to them a Warranty Deed and ends just three months later when
on October 1, 1996, the Farmanians convey a warranty deed to the Lawrences. There is
absolutely nothing in the record that reveals the Farmanians having any interest in the Lawrence
property prior to June 28, 1996.
Funk testifies that he only made two to three trips to his property after 1975 and made
absolutely no trips after 1981, a full fifteen years before the Farmanians take an interest in the
property. It simply is not possible for the Farmanians to know what road(s) the Funks used or
even what part of their property the Funks visited. There simply is no evidence in the record of
the Farmanians ever visiting the property, actually witnessing anyone using the road, or even
knowing any of the history of the property. And, they certainly cannot testify to anyone's use of
the road prior to 1996.
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ROOK AFFIDAVIT
Capstar argues that there is no indication in the record that the medication Mr. Rook was
on when he signed his affidavit, affected Mr. Rook's ability to perceive and understand what he
was doing when he signed the affidavit in 2004. Capstar further attempts to minimize the
medication issue by making the unsupported claim that the medication only affected his ability
to recall the period of time after he signed the affidavit, which is not what Mr. Rook testifies to.
During deposition, Mr. Rook was asked by J.P. Whelan "Now, can you tell me, how did
this affidavit come into being? Was it prepared by Susan Weeks?" Rook's answer "You know, /
don't even recall it." [RD (Rook Deposition) 47:21-24, R. 35120 v.2 p.412] A few moments later
Mr. Rook is asked "And do you think you read this before you signed it? " His answer,
"probably." [RD 48:16-18] Meaning, Mr. Rook can't even testify to the fact that he even read the
affidavit before he signed it or even knew what the affidavit contained. Mr. Rook explains why
he doesn't remember the affidavit. At the time he signed it, he was on some "pretty strong
medication" [RD 48:4] for a heart attack and offers "/ don't recall much ofanything during this
period that / had my heart attack. " [RD 48:7-9]
Mr. Rook's deposition notice required that Mr. Rook produce documentation for his
deposition. When Mr. Rook arrived at his deposition, he was asked for this documentation, he
produced nothing. According to Mr. Rook, about four years earlier, he had tossed every single
thing that had to do with his radio and broadcast career out. [RD 5:8-10] He kept absolutely no
paperwork of any kind relating to the radio station. He certainly didn't bring a copy of the
affidavit he signed.
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Regarding the affidavit, Mr. Rook said "he didn't recall it" meaning, he doesn't have any
recollection of it at all. Having no recollection implies that he cannot testify to anything
contained in the affidavit. He simply doesn't know whats it says or what it contains. Obviously,
the medication Mr. Rook was on at the time he signed his affidavit affected his mental capacities.
He testifies that he doesn't recall much from the period that he had his heart attack and really
points to the medication as the cause.
The real purpose of depositions are to get to the facts of what an individual knows and
what an individual can testify to. The fact of the matter is: Rook does not testify that he read the
affidavit; does not testify that he is aware of its contents; does not testify that he understood what
he was signing when he signed it. And, when asked what he knew about specific statements
made in his affidavit, he could not validate those statements. For example: Mr. Rook's affidavit
contained this statement in paragraph 4 "The existing private road was visible and in use by
Funks at the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel" When asked about this statement
Mr. Rook replied "How do I know it was Mr. Funk's access? I have no - - I wouldn't. I can only
say that thats the one road that I used or that my station used going in and out of that place over
all the time we owned it was that one road." [RD 52:24 - 53:3] A few moments later, Mr. Rook
was asked: "How do you know that the Funks were using that road at the time Kootenai
Broadcasting purchased its parcel?" His answer, "The only thing - the only answer to that is
that thats what Bill Gott would have told us was - whether Funks used it, I don't know whether_
Funks had been up that hill before. I'd never met the man. "[RD 56:24 - 57:5]
Here, Mr. Rook's deposition testimony completely contradicts the statement( s) offered in
his affidavit. Yet, the trial court completely ignores what Mr. Rook said regarding this in his
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deposition. The trial court writes "John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later
time in 1989 when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land Rook testified in his qffidavit
that in 1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funk's parcels
in the Southwest Quarter ofSection 22. Affidavit ofJohn Rook in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment, p. 3 ,-r,-r 4, 6. [R. 35120 p. 586]
The trial court either didn't review Mr. Rook's deposition testimony, just dismissed it, or
had other motives for citing his affidavit testimony and not citing his deposition testimony.
Clearly, there are obvious conflicts between his affidavit and his deposition that the trial court
didn't resolve in its written decision. Because of the conflicts in his testimony and the fact Mr.
Rook cannot testify to anything in his affidavit, the trial court should have completely impeached
the Rook affidavit and therefore the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the affidavit
testimony.

PREJUDGMENT ACCESS TO THE LAWRENCE LAND
One of the issues raised in their opening brief was whether or not the trial court abused
its discretion by granting Capstar prejudgment access to the Lawrence parcel, without the
application of a TRO, Preliminary Injunction, or the taking of a bond. This issue refers to a
hearing that was held on October 29,2007 in which Capstar filed an application for access across
the Lawrence parcel. [HT (Hearing Transcript) 119:1-131:3]
This application was filed with the trial court together with a motion to shorten time, just
three days before the hearing was held. With only three days notice, the Lawrences were unable
to file a reply brief.
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The Lawrences objected to the motion to shorten time on the grounds that the motion did
not cite a rule, nor did it state a reason to shorten time, nor did it have an affidavit in support. The
Lawrences also objected to the application for access on the grounds that there was no rule cited,
no affidavit in support, no injunction or TRO in place, and no bond in place. The Lawrences also
argued that when the trial court issued a permanent injunction, the permanent injunction
superseded the preliminary injunction, resulting in the exoneration of the bond Capstar posted for
the preliminary injunction. Then, when the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the decision that
created the permanent injunction, that it only stands to reason that the permanent injunction
would not be left in place. Therefore, having no preliminary injunction in place and no
permanent injunction in place, before the trail court could grant access to Capstar, Capstar would
necessarily have to apply for a TRO or preliminary il1iunction and post another bond. The
Lawrences' objections were summarily over ruled and the trial court granted Capstar access.
Capstar offered absolutely no argument or response regarding this issue in their reply brief.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
Capstar acknowledges on reply that the Lawrences correctly noted that the trial court
made an error regarding the prescriptive period as applied to Funk. Capstar then goes on to argue
that the trial court evidently became confused regarding the dates. And, that this defect in the
Court's analysis regarding the time period of Funk's use does not invalidate the trail court's
finding that there was a prescriptive easement established over the property. Because, according
to Capstar, the record shows that the Funks made two or three trips to the property between the
six year period of 1975 and 1981.
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As discussed earlier at some length, the Funks retained legal title to the Lawrence parcel
until the year 1992. Because the Funks were in still title to the property from the years 1975 1981, the Funk's use of their own property could never have ripened into a prescriptive use.
Capstar completely ignores this fact.
Also, Capstar seemingly ignores the fact that the Funks completely abandoned their use
of the road after 1981. For the eight year period immediately preceding the creation of the
Capstar parcel, the Funks make not a single use of the road. The Lawrences will argue, that the
trial court also erred by not considering this fact. One of the elements required to establish an
easement by prescription is that the use of the easement is "continuous and uninterrupted" for the
statutory period. What the Funks testify to is that over a six year period, they made roughly two
or three trips - then completely abandoned the use of the road. It is certainly hard to understand
how two or three uses over a six year period rises to the level of "continuous and uninterrupted."
It is even more difficult to understand how the trial court could conclude that an eight year

absence is not an uninterrupted use.
The statutory period for the present action is five years. In effect, the Funks abandoned
their use of the road for three years more than the required statutory period. Therefore, whatever
claims over the road the trial court concluded the Funks acquired, the trial court should have also
concluded that they were extinguished through abandonment. It only stands to reason, that if the
use of a road for the prescriptive period can benefit the dominant estate, then non-use of a road
for the same prescriptive period should benefit the servient estate. It doesn't make equitable sense
that rights only accrue in favor of the dominant estate and never in favor ofthe servient estate.
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Capstar also argues on reply that the origin of the easement is known. According to
Capstar, it commenced on the purchase of the Funk property and continued after severance.
In Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474,129 P3d 1223 (2006), this Court reiterated the
general rule that the regular crossing of another's property was presumed to be adverse with the
exception where a landowner constructed a way over his land for his use and convenience, the
mere use of it by others that doesn't interfere with his use will be presumed permissive. Capstar
then goes on to argue that the trial court had no basis to presume Funks use of the road was
permissive because there is no evidence that Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road.
This assertion clearly goes against the all evidence in this record and what Capstar has been
testifying to all along. In its Memorandum in Support of Renewed Summary Judgment [R. 35120
v.l p. 20] Capstar acknowledges that they do not know who built the road " When the road
providing access to the Funk's Section 21 and Section 22 parcels was established is unknown."
Capstar also acknowledges that the road was there prior to the Funks taking title to their land. [R.
35120 v.l p. 13] 'The private road used by GTe, Funk, and Rook was the only existing road
that provided access to the parcels at the time that Funks purchased the property. " The 1959
Metsker map clearly shows the road as having existed as early as 1959, some seven years prior to
GTC acquiring easement rights and building a tower site. The evidence also shows that this road
was in existence when GTC acquired easement rights. Exhibits 2 and 3 are copies of the
easements GTC acquired from Blossom and Ulrich which state in part:
"Grantee is granted the right to make all necessary improvements and minor
relocation on the present road site in order to facilitate moving its equipment and
machines to and from the site of said microwave tower."
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It is clearly undisputed that the road existed prior to GTC acquiring easement rights in

1966. The trial court should have concluded, lacking evidence to the contrary, that the road was
built as early as 1959 and for the specific use and convenience of owners at that time. As this
Court noted in Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P2d 975, 979 (1997)
"Use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general public, in the
absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and exclusive
use on his part, negates any presumption of individual right there in his favor."

Therefore, the trial court should have directed its inquiry towards a decisive act that
constituted some actual invasion or infringement of the rights of the owner of the servient
property in order to determine if the use amounted to an adverse use. Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho
770, 554 P2d 948 (1976). There is absolutely no evidence in the record that indicates any
decisive act on the part of Funk or Rook that would constitute an actual infringement of rights.
On the contrary, both Funk's and Rook's deposition testimony evidences just the opposite. Both
testify that they were given keys to the gate. Both testified that they believed they had permission
to use the road. And, neither testified that they used the road adversely to anyone's rights or
under any claim of right.
To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: 1) open and notorious; 2) continuous and
uninterrupted; 3) adverse and with a claim of right; 4) with an actual or implied knowledge of the
owner of the servient tenement; 5) for the statutory period. To establish an easement by
prescription, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence of all of the elements
necessary for a prescriptive easement.
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The Lawrences contend that not only has Capstar failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence supporting all of the elements required for a prescriptive use, they simply cannot prove
anyone element. There simply is no evidence to support Capstar's prescriptive use claim.
Capstar has simply failed to establish a Prima Facie case.

DISQUALIFICATION
Two of the issues the Lawrences raise on appeal is whether or not the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself for cause and whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion by conducting an independent investigation. In support of these issues, the Lawrences
establish twelve facts that they believe would certainly give cause to question the trial court's
impartiality.
In its reply brief, Capstar devotes a single page in response, portraying the Lawrences as
doing nothing more than taking umbrage with the trial court's rulings that the Lawrences
disagree with. Capstar does not provide any argument regarding the twelve facts the Lawrences
raise in their opening brief. Capstar simply glosses over the issues by ignoring the facts. Yes, the
Lawrences do take umbrage with the trial court's ruling. The Lawrences have been fighting this
litigation for nine years. In defense of this litigation, the Lawrences have taken depositions,
acquired affidavits, searched court and county records, and have produced a body of evidence
that clearly goes against Capstar's claims. All, for it to be simply dismissed by the trial court. It is
simply too hard to rationalize how the trial court can simply ignore all the rebuttal evidence in
this case. How could the trial court ignore the fact that Mellick road entered the Funk's land in
Section 15? How could the trial court ignore the fact that the Funks were in legal title to the land
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they supposedly prescribed an easement across? How could the trial court so misinterpret the
directives of the Idaho Supreme Court on remand?
There can only be one of two answers. Either the trial court is completely incompetent or
the trial court was simply going to find a way, any way, to rule in favor of Capstar and Tower.
The Lawrences, no doubt, believes the latter.
FACT 1. The trial court made a significant number of errors in materialfacts. Because
this issue was discussed at length in the Appellant's opening brief under a discussion of the
evidence, the Appellants won't belabor the issue by reviewing the errors. But the fact is the trial
court made at least twenty-four errors in findings of fact and each and every error was used to
support a ruling in favor of the Respondents. And, they were not harmless errors as Capstar
portrays, but fundamental errors.
FACT 2. The trial court's clearly erroneous and contradictory findings made in the 2004
summary judgments for Tower and Capstar and denying Lawrences' timely motionfor an
extension of time to finish discovery prior to a summary judgment hearing. Initially in Capstar,
the Appellants were Pro Se. A hearing was held on Capstar's motion for summary judgment.
Prior to the hearing, the Lawrences filed a timely motion to move the court to provide an
enlargement of time because Capstar had not provided timely answers to defendants admissions,
interrogatories, and demand for production. Furthermore, the answers Capstar did provide were
vague and questionable. Rather than grant an enlargement of time to allow the Lawrences ample
time to dispute the facts, the court just ruled on the issue of an express easement. The Lawrences
presented good rebuttal facts concerning the express easement theory, all of which were
summarily dismissed by the court with a total disregard to Lawrences' arguments. The court
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granted summary judgment in favor of Capstar, in part by repeatedly finding that the sales
agreement and deed were clear and unambiguous.
Facing a similar upcoming hearing on Tower's motion for summary judgment, the
Lawrences retained John P. Whelan who represented them at hearing. Mr. Whelan explained to
the court the doctrine of merger and presented good arguments against Tower's express easement
theories. Lawrences' arguments were again, summarily overruled. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Tower, this time finding the deed to be ambiguous. The basic tenets of stare
decisis dictate that the law shall be consistent and applied in an even handed and predictable
way. Due process of law would seemingly require a similar result. Yet, in the present matter, the
trial court reached seemingly arbitrary and capricious results. The Lawrences appealed both
decisions and on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found in favor of the Lawrences, reversing the
court's order and remanding it back for further proceedings. In a footnote in the Tower opinion,
the Idaho Supreme Court even questions how the trial court could conclude the deed to be
ambiguous in one case and unambiguous in another.
FACT 3. Confining the initial summary judgment ruling on the express easement theory
alone. Obviously, the trial court would have had a harder time justifying the findings of a
prescriptive easement and implied easement, together in the same decision, with a finding of an
express easement. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question whether the trail court
was attempting to offer the Respondents their best shot at all their easement theories by
disassociating the finding of an express easement from findings on the other easement theories.
While this issue was not raised by the Appellants on their first appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
in Tower noted in part: Final resolution o/this case would have been expedited, had the district
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court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue .... By confining its consideration to
the express easement issue, justice in this case has been delayed
FACT 4. Summarily ruling infavor of the Respondents on each and every easement
theory they put before the court and ultimately ruling in their favor on their express easement,
easement by necessity, easement by implication by prior use, and prescriptive easement theories.
The Lawrences are being sued by both Tower and Capstar over each and every easement theory
recognized by law and over the course of these proceedings, the trial court has determined that
both Tower (or Tower's landlord who is not a party to this case) and Capstar have express
easements, implied easements by prior use, easements by necessity, and prescriptive easements
across the Appellants land. It begs the question, how could the trial court possibly find, in a
summary judgment ruling, that ALL the legal elements necessary to establish ALL the various
easement theories were present in essentially the Funk/Human Synergistics sales agreement, the
Funk affidavit, and either the Rook or the Hall affidavit? And, it raises a host of other questions
and issues: How can a party have an express easement AND an easement by necessity AND an
easement by implication AND a prescriptive easement over another party's land? How could a
party's use of an express or implied easement ripen into a prescriptive use? How could the
element of necessity be satisfied if an express easement exists? While Funk sold the now
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics in 1975 under a real estate contract, the title didn't
convey to Human Synergistics until 1992. How could Funk create a prescriptive right across the
land he was in title to at the time? How could there exist an easement to the Capstar's parcel in
1975, when Capstar's parcel wasn't created until 1989? Even on the surface, the ruling appears
not to be a well thought out, well reasoned finding of fact and conclusion oflaw. It reads more
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like a shot-gun blast where the lower court is just going to find reasons to rule in favor of the
Respondents. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question whether the trail court was
attempting to offer the Respondents their best shot at all their easement theories.
FACT 5. Seemingly dismissing and/or ignoring the summary judgment rebuttal evidence
the Lawrences' put before the court. Again, because this issue was raised earlier in this brief, the
Appellants will not belabor the point other than to list it among those facts that the Appellants
point to as why the court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
FACT 6. The trail court's final judgment that the plaintiflltenantllessee (of Hall) has an
easement by prescription, an easement implied by prior use. and an easement by necessity. At
summary judgment in Tower, the Appellants argued that on first appeal in Tower, the Idaho
Supreme Court established that title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title an easement
appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate. Furthermore, that Hall, who is not a party to this suit is
the record owner of the dominant estate and as a result, Tower lacks standing to seek quiet title
declaration in its favor. In its memorandum and decision, the trial court argues that the
Appellants assertions (in Tower) that Tower lacks standing to pursue easement theories of
implication or necessity is without merit and as a result, grants partial summary judgment in
favor of Tower and declares that the plaintiff/tenant/lessee has easements by prescription,
implication, and necessity.
Not only was the quiet titling of an easement in favor of the tenant wrong, it seemingly
contradicts the trial court's own reasoning in its memorandum and decision when the court states
"the only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower Asset, as a
tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord,
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Halls ... .In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to iJ?junctive relief, as
their landlords, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established by prior use, by
necessity and by prescription. .. " Clearly, the trial court was going to find any reason whatsoever
to grant Tower an easement across the Appellant's land. And, it is obvious that the trial court did
not read the directions ofIdaho Supreme Court on remand or most likely, the trial court simply
rejected it. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question the court's impartiality
whenever the trial court so clearly disobeys the decisions and directives of the Idaho Supreme
Court.
FACT 7. The continued refusal by the court to disqualifY itselffor cause. On June 6,
2007, the Lawrences properly file a motion for disqualification for cause together with the
affidavit of John P. Whelan and the motion was heard on June 13,2007. The affidavit and oral
argument offered facts surrounding Yovichin v. Bush, CV-O 1-2116; a case involving both the
court and the Appellant's attorney John P. Whelan and in which the court disqualified himself for
unexplained reasons. Also offered were facts surrounding Sauls v. Luchi, CV-04-1616; Straub v.
Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 31955); Krivor v. Rogers, CV-06-6252; and
Metropolitan Property & Causality v. Allen, CV-06-6358; all cases in which the Appellant's
attorney believed establishes facts that demonstrates a particular bias the court has against Mr.
Whelan and Mr. Whelan's representation of the Appellants.
Rather than determine the legal sufficiency of the motion for disqualification at the
hearing, the court simply withheld judgment and adjured "to take a closer look." On June 27,
2007, the court published a rather detailed written decision in which the court simply refutes
each and every fact or charge raised by the Appellant's attorney. In its memorandum of decision,
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the only rational the court really gives for not disqualifying itself, is an argument that the court
harbors no bias towards the Lawrences or their attorney. It certainly offered nothing that would
convince the Lawrences of the court's impartiality. The memorandum and decision was simply
nothing more than the trial court's attempt to defend it's interest in this case. In determining
whether a trial judge should be disqualified, inquiry is not only whether there was an actual bias
on judge's part, but also whether judge's conduct or words created "such likelihood of bias or an
appearance of bias that judge was unable to hold balance between vindicating interest of court
and interest of accused. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14. State v. Garza, 865 P2d 463, 125 Or. App.
385, review denied 876 P2d 783, 319 Or. 81
Clearly, a truly impartial court would be absolutely impartial as to whether or not it was
the finder and trier of fact. It has no personal interest in the matter at all. It has no motive, no
rational, and no reason to be involved

other than the administration of justice. Because the

courts are the only institution in this country that the citizenry can tum to for the administration
of justice, the court has to be exceedingly mindful, not only of its role, but also of its appearance.
A truly impartial court would conclude that the appearance of justice is such an essential
component of justice, that without it, justice cannot be served and for the sake of justice alone,
the court has no other choice but to recuse itself. Even in the case in which a judge may be
convinced of his or her own impartiality, the appearance of bias or prejudice can so undermine
litigants confidence in proceeding or public's confidence in system as to require judges
disqualification. Comiskey v. District Court In and For the County of Pueblo 926 P2d 539,
Rehearing denied
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It can be also argued that a court that it is unwilling to recluse itself, can no longer claim

that is it truly impartial. Once the court defends its reasoning and rationale for refusing to recuse
itself, it creates a self interest or personal stake in the matter and can no longer hold the balance
between vindicating its interest and the interest of the party asserting impartiality. The court
unconsciously becomes tainted in defending its role. In the present matter, the fact that the court
put so much time and energy into refuting the facts raised by the Appellants' attorney and
defending itself is a clear indicator that the court is no longer impartial. It clearly demonstrates
that the trial court has a personal stake in the proceedings that it wishes to defend. In Price v.

Featherson, 64 Idaho 312, 130 P2d 853, this court states "The truth of the filed affidavit
charging bias or prejudice on the part of the judge is not what disqualifies the judge, but the
affidavit itself" Supporting the notion that the appearance of bias or prejudice so undermines the
confidence citizens have in the court as to render its administration of justice in a matter
illegitimate. The commentary to Canon 1 (Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct) furthers this in part:

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
by judges. Ajudge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A
judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. Ajudge must
therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The
prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not
practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general
terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically
mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations
of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for violation
of this Canon is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. [Emphasis added]
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FACT 8. The court conducted an independent investigation in to the case of the Estate of
Diane Rothe. Again, returning to Mr. Whelan's June 13, 2007 affidavit regarding Yovichin v.
Bush, CVO 1 2116, Mr. Whelan raises questions surrounding the court's voluntary disqualification
in that case [R. 35120 v.l p.98-100] and questions whether the reasons the court voluntarily
disqualified itself from that case, still exists today. In the court's memorandum and decision, the
court speculates that a more likely reason the court voluntarily disqualified itself in Yovichin,
rnay have dealt with the facts surrounding the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai
County Case No. SP 675. The court acknowledges that it reviewed the court file in that case. [R
35120 v.l p.072] The Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was not part of the Appellant's
briefing, testimony, or oral argument. There was no evidence before the court relating to the
Estate of Dianne Rothe. Rather, the court conducted an independent investigation of the motion
before the court, produced findings regarding that investigation, and rendered those findings in
support of the courts decision to deny Appellants motion. Beyond the fact that it was improper
for the court to look outside the record in reaching a decision and to offer speculation rather than
fact. The independent fact finding clearly illustrates the extent to which the trial court was
compelled to reach in order to vindicate its interest in this case.
The Court's response to Mr. Whelan at hearing, that the Court simply wanted to figure out
what was in the Court's mind back when the Court disqualified itself in Yovichin appears to be
sincere and likely an honest mistake. However, regardless of how good the intentions may have
been, they still don't justify the fact that the court looked outside the record to investigate facts
relevant to a motion and an issue specifically before the court. What is more troubling is the fact
that the court defends and justifies its actions by implying that the Court is not restrained from
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looking outside the record, so long as it doesn't involve the central issue in the case, i.e., the
easement issue. [HT 49:8-11] The court's position on this issue certainly doesn't appear to be
consistent with the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. The commentary to Canon 3 (Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct) specifically states: "Ajudge must not independently investigate facts in a case

and must consider only the evidence presented." The commentary to Canon 3 certainly doesn't
appear to provide exceptions to the rule, nor did the trial court cite an authority. The Appellants
will argue that the Court's position regarding this issue is arbitrary and not supported by law.
Therefore, it is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question the Court's impartiality.
FACT 9. The court is a personal friend ofa senior partner in the law practice

representing the Respondents and that same law practice was the second highest campaign
contributor the the judge's re-election campaign. The Appellants also offer the fact that the
attorney for both Capstar and Tower, Susan Weeks, is a law partner of Leander James, a personal
friend of the court which the court affirms in its decision. [R35120 v.l p. 78]
The commentary on Canon 5 (Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct) also states that campaign
contributions, of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear before the
judge may be relevant to disqualification under Section 3E. At the June 13, 2007 hearing on the
Appellant's motion for Disqualification [HT 15 :20 -16:3], the Appellant's attorney offered
evidence obtained through the Sunshine law disclosure that Ms. Week's law firm was also the
second highest contributor to the judge's re-election campaign. It is entirely reasonable for the
Appellants to question whether or not this judge was influenced in part, either by his personal
relationship with a partner in the opposing law firm, or by that firm's contribution to his reelection campaign.
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FACT 10. The trial court accusing the Lawrence's attorney for not being truthful to the
court regarding the preliminary injunction. On October 31, 2007, a hearing was held in the
present case. Capstar moved for a motion to shorten time and application of a sixth access. At
hearing, many issues were raised by John Whelan, specifically with regards to the motion
including the lack of a supporting affidavit, failure to cite a rule, the lack of a bond posting, and
in particular, the lack of a preliminary injunction order.[HT 123:2-125:6] Mr. Whelan argued that
there was no preliminary injunction outstanding. That the preliminary injunction was superseded
by a permanent injunction when the court granted summary judgment and which also resulted in
the bond being exonerated back to Capstar. Later, when the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the
district courts summary judgment and remanded the case back, that the permanent injunction was
overturned. At no time did Mr. Whelan say that the Supreme Court overturned the Preliminary
Injunction. Prior to making a ruling, the court recessed to review the language of the Supreme
Court opinion and upon its return, the court accused Mr. Whelan for not being truthful to the
court [HT 129:23-25] in making a claim that the preliminary injunction was reversed. The
transcript of that hearing speaks for itself. The trial court completely misconstrued what Mr.
Whelan stated and was in err in accusing Mr. Whelan of not being truthful to the court. The
court's response to Mr. Whelan illustrates that the court does not believe Mr. Whelan to be
credible or truthful and can be indicative of an underlying current of animosity and/or contempt
either against the Appellants or Mr. Whelan.
FACT 11. The trial court granting Capstar prejudgment access across the Lawrence
parcel on only three days notice, without an injunction in place, without an affidavit in support
of the motion, without a motion that cites a rule, without the posting of a bond and without an
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application/or a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Referring back to the
October 31, 2007 hearing in which Capstar sought an access across the Lawrence parcel, the
court granted Capstar access to the Lawrence parcel over the Appellant's objections regarding the
lack of statutory notice, the lack of an affidavit, the lack of a rule cited in the motion, the lack of
an injunction in place, and the fact that there was no bond posted. [HT 123:3- 125:7]
FACT 12. The complete disparity in the admittance o/the Respondents affidavit

testimony as compared to the striking 0/ the Appellant's affidavit testimony The trial court
seemingly appeared to use a double standard in regards to the admission of affidavit testimony.
The affidavits produced by Tower and Capstar, specifically the Rook, Hall, and Funk affidavits
were all drafted and prepared by Tower and Capstar's legal counsel and subsequently sent to the
affiant(s) to sign. Because they were drafted by legal counsel, they were not the words ofthe
affiant, but the words of the attorney drafting them. John Rook testified in deposition that he not
only didn't remember providing an affidavit, but that at the time he signed it, he was under heavy
medication for medical reasons. Clearly, these statements alone completely impeached his
affidavit (or should have). It is likewise obvious from Harold Funk's deposition, that Harold
Funk did not understand the affidavit he was signing as his deposition testimony is not in
alignment with his affidavit testimony. Because the Lawrences were unable to serve Robert Hall
(after six attempts) to take his deposition, the Lawrences are left with unanswered questions
regarding the facts Robert Hall can and will actually testify to.
On July 24, 2007, Appellant Douglas Lawrence submitted a twenty-six page affidavit [R.
35120 v.2 p. 146-292] in opposition to the Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Attached
to this affidavit were an additional 121 pages of exhibits in support of the facts Mr. Lawrence
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establishes in his affidavit. Those exhibits include (A) a certified copy of a 1907 Viewer's Report
and Road Survey; (B & C) a court order and summary judgment signed by Judge Gary Haman in
Case No. 65077; (D) the affidavit of Bruce Anderson, County Surveyor for Kootenai County; (E)
a portion of a 1959 Metsker Map (the complete 1959 Metsker Map was made part of the record
in 2004); (F) satellite imagery as produced by the Google Earth computer program illustrating
the roads on Blossom Mountain and the places whereby the photography in Exhibit G were
taken; (G) photography of the road taken by the Appellant; (H) various police reports; (I) the
Nextel License agreement; (J-P) various documents; (Q) Great Northern Broadcasting License
Agreement; (R-S) admissions and an invoice; (T) affidavit of Wilber Mead; (V) Kootenai Cable
Lease Agreement; (W) Trinity Broadcast/John Rook Letter and lease agreement.
The Appellants are not attorneys and did not receive any direction, guidance, or
suggestions from their attorney in producing that affidavit. And, they were not familiar with a lot
of the legal concepts regarding affidavits. However, the words in that affidavit are the affiant
own words and not the product of an attorney inventing or sculpting facts that best serve their
interest and cannot be unsubstantiated by the record in this case. As testified to by the
Appellant's exhibits, the Appellant has performed a lot of research on this road and simply set
forth the facts the Appellant uncovered in research. And, in support of those facts, the Appellant
attached 121 pages of supporting exhibits.
In Hook v. Horner, 95 Idaho 657,517 P2d 554 (1973), this Court ruled that "A
landowner is a competent witness to the location of the boundaries ofhis own land if they are
within his personal knowledge, and may testifY to the same. His interest in the outcome of the
litigation would affect the weight to be given to his testimony, but not its admissibility." Clearly,
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the Appellants have spent many hours walking the properties on Blossom Mountain; many hours
reviewing historical county and court records, deeds, titles, and easements; and spent time
consulting with surveyors and other property owners. The exhibits themselves testify to that fact.
The Respondents moved the trial court to strike all the relevant portions of the
Appellant's affidavit testimony and was entirely successful at getting the trial court to strike
complete paragraphs over foundation, argument, or some other technicality. Much of the
Respondent's motion doesn't even identify the words or phrases that created the technicality. The
motion simply identifies a paragraph and moves that it should be stricken because it contains
argument. The foundational issues in particular, should have been overruled as there were
exhibits in support of the facts and court needed to look no further than the exhibits or the record
itself for the foundation. While it would have been proper for the trial court to "weigh" the
Lawrences testimony; it was improper for the court to strike it from the record.
Yet, even though the exhibits themselves were admitted, the trial court either ignored
them or discounted them. In its memorandum and decision, the trial court cites the exact
testimony it relies on in rendering its decision. The trial court cites Susan Week's affidavit
twenty-seven times to establish the chains of title in the respective properties; the Rook affidavit
six times; the Funk affidavit ten times; the Wenkler affidavit once; the Brownsberger affidavit
twice; and the Rebor affidavit thrice. As far as the defense's testimony, the trial court cites the
Lawrence affidavit four times; the Mack affidavit twice; the Anderson affidavit once; the Funk
deposition thrice; and the Loudin v. Stokes case once. However, each time the court cited the
defense's testimony, it did so only to use it against the defense.
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It also seems somewhat egregious to strike a whole paragraph of testimony simply

because the paragraph may contain some argument. The motions should have been overruled due
to the fact the Respondent(s) failed to cite the words or phrases creating the argument.
The Appellants also moved the court to strike portions of the Hall, Rook, and Funk
affidavit. And, in stark contrast to the Respondent's motions to strike, the Appellant's motion laid
out the specific words and phrases in each paragraph that created the foundational or other
problem with the statement. However, the Appellants were only successful at getting what
amounts to a total of five words stricken from the Rook affidavit.
In a summary judgment ruling, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor
of the opposing party. In the present matter, the trial court simply ruled each and every fact on
each and every easement theory presented by Capstar and Tower is uncontradicted. Therefore,
the court does not have to construe anything in the Appellant's favor and can simply award each
and every claim to Capstar and Tower. It is so terribly difficult (rather impossible) to rationalize
how a one hundred and forty-seven page affidavit with one hundred and twenty-one pages of
exhibits together with eighty-four pages of deposition testimony fails to create a scintilla of
doubt on anyone fact or issue. The only rational explanation is the that the trail court has turned
a blind eye and deaf ear towards the Appellant's evidence and the Appellants are entirely
reasonable to question the court's impartiality.
Due process, the appearance of fairness, and the Code of Judicial Conduct require
disqualification of a judge who is biased against a party or whose impartiality may reasonably be
questioned. CJC 3(D)(1). Woljkill Feed and Fertilizer Corp. v. Martin, 14 P3d 877, 103
Wash. App. 836. "Bias" requiring change of judge connotes leaning of mind or inclination toward
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one person over another. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 40.1 (b)(2) Brown v. Avery. 850 P2d 612,
UYoming 1993.
In Sherman v. State, 905 P2d 355, 128 Wash.2d 164, reconsideration denied and
amended, the Washington Supreme Court held that the test for determining whether a judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, such that a judge should be recused, is an objective
test that assumes that a reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant facts. The
Appellants will argue: that they are reasonable person(s); they understand the facts of this case;
and they are capable of rendering an objective test regarding the judge's impartiality.
The reasonable person is a legal fiction of the common law representing an objective
standard against which any individual's conduct can be measured. The standard only requires that
people act similarly to how "a reasonable person under the circumstance" would, as if their
limitations were themselves circumstances. Factors external to the defendant are always relevant;
so is the context within which each action is made. It is within these circumstances that the
determinations and actions of the defendant are to be judged. There are myriad factors that could
provide inputs into how a person acts; yet the level of care due is always what is reasonable for
that set of circumstances.
The Lawrences will argue, that throughout these proceedings, that their actions and
personal conduct are unblemished and have exceeded what would be reasonable for any other
person under this set of circumstances. There is absolutely nothing in this record that would
portray the Lawrences as being anything other than reasonable or given to extremes. The same
argument can be made for the Lawrences' attorney J.P. Whelan who also was convinced that the
trial court harbored a bias or prejUdice. As Mr. Whelan explained at hearing:
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"I have had to consider this issue for a long period of time, great deal of depth,
and my experience with this court now spans almost six years. This motion is
made only because this counsel truly believes that after six years of appearances
before this court that this court has a bias or prejudice against this counsel, a
personality conflict of sorts ... That bias or prejudice spills over to my
representation of my clients, and I believe I would be remiss in my duties if I
didn't make this motion because I believe, for my purpose, that the best thing I
can do for my client is to try and get them a fair trial." [HT 16:20-18:7]
There can be no doubt, that Mr. Whelan considered this action for a long period of time
before initiating the motion and only did so because he was absolutely convinced that his clients
could not get a fair trial with that court. It would seem entirely reasonable for any attorney, given
the same circumstances, to resort to the same actions.
The Appellants' Opening Brief, together with this brief, should be a testimony to this
Court, that the Lawrences clearly understand all the relevant facts of this case. Their briefs were
not written by attorneys or paralegals. They were authored by the Appellants themselves, without
the assistance of anyone. In its reply brief, Capstar offers no argument that the Lawrences do not
understand the facts of the case. Rather, they just argue that the Lawrences are merely taking
umbrage with the trial court's adverse decisions.
Capstar doesn't make any argument nor cite any case law that would preclude a defendant
from being capable of rendering an objective test regarding the judge's impartiality. The
Lawrences are capable, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, of rendering an objective
test regarding the judge's impartiality. They have correctly identified and argued twelve specific
facts that they believe demonstrate why the trial court's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned and why the Lawrences believe trial court abused its discretion by failing to recuse
itself.
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LATCHES AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
In its reply brief, Capstar argues that it had no need to defend its legal rights to the road
until the Lawrences began blocking the road. And, because of this, the Lawrences' defense using
the doctrine of latches and statue of limitations does not apply. Capstar seemingly argues, that
because no one challenged their use of the road prior to the Lawrences, that they (and their
predecessors) simply bear no responsibility to legitimize any rights they claim to have on the
road. They offer no case law in support of this claim; nor does Capstar provide any argument in
support.
There can be no doubt that Capstar is now seeking to assert rights they claim goes back
thirty or more years. As Capstar states on page 44 of their reply brief "The origin of this
easement is known. It commenced on purchase of the Funk property and continues to this day."
Throughout these proceedings, Capstar has asserted the claim that when the Funks purchased
their property, the only road providing access to Funks land is the GTC access road. Capstar
furthers this claim by relying on the Funk/Human Synergistic Sale Agreement, asserting that the
subject to and including language was the Funks putting everyone on notice that the Funks were
claiming a right to use the road. It begs the question, if the Funks and their successors relied on
this language, then why didn't they attempt to perfect their easement rights earlier?
As the Montana Supreme Court ruled in Brabender v. Kit Mfg. Co. 174 Mont. 63,568
P2d 547 (1977), "Latches is negligence in the assertion ofa right. It exists when there has been
an undue delay of such duration or character as to render the enforcement ofan asserted right
inequitable. " There can be no doubt that neither the Funks, nor Capstar, nor Tower, ever asserted

any rights to the road prior to 2002.
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Capstar argues that because the Lawrences were able to take the depositions of Funk and
Rook, that they can't show prejudice. However, when it comes to the Funk/Human Synergistics
Sale Agreement, Funk's testimony only presents one point of view. In order to challenge Funk's
affidavit testimony regarding the sale agreement, it would be necessary to get the testimony of
Human Synergistics so that the trial court could weigh what the real understanding was between
Funk and Human Synergistics. Due to the lapse of time, the Lawrences could not take the
testimony of Human Synergistics to challenge Funks affidavit testimony. This certainly did
prejudice the Lawrences defense.
Kootenai Broadcasting, Idaho Broadcasting, AGM, and Capstar, all had actual and
constructive notice of their possible access issues. There is nothing more indicative of a potential
access problem than having to first pass through someone's private locked gate for ingress/egress
to your parcel. Funk's successors to the Capstar parcel are all corporations. All are business
entities who purchased the Capstar parcel as a business asset. All are required to perform due
diligence. It is simply impossible to understand how each and every business in this chain title
were not aware that the parcel was devoid of deeded access. Especially, given the fact, that the
deeds they received did not convey any access rights across the neighboring lands. The warranty
deed Kootenai Broadcasting received from Harold Funk specifically included a right of way to
construct a road and right of way for utilities. This language evidences the fact that Mr. Rook had
contemplated easement rights prior to his purchase of the Capstar parcel. He wanted to make
sure he had the rights to bring utilities to his parcel and also that he had the rights to build a road
across the land still retained by Harold Funk.
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Mr. Funk: testified that he did not approach the owners of the Section 28 parcel for an
access. He recognized he didn't have an easement across Section 28 and did not have access
rights to pass on to Mr. Rook. More importantly, Mr. Rook does not testify that he thought he had
an easement to the county road. Rather, he had permission. The following exchange took place at
Mr. Rook's deposition: [RD 53:6-22 R. 35210 v. 2 p 413]
Rook: "there was a ... an access agreement ofsorts with GTE, J think, that gave
us the right to use that road, and J have that in the files, J remember. "
Whelan: Those are the files that are gone?
Rook: Yes
Whelan: Okay. So you think: you had an access agreement with GTE that
permitted you and your station to use that road for access?
Rook: Right.
Whelan: And that's the road that was created by GTE?
Rook: J don't know who created it. The one that came upfrom Signal Point
through the gate we mentioned
Whelan: Okay. And that was a permissive use, they told you to go ahead and use
that access?
Rook: Yes

Clearly, Mr. Rook knew that he did not have legal access to the county road when he
acquired the parcel from Harold Funk:. Otherwise, he would not have testified that he thought he
had GTE's permission to use the road. Rook knew he didn't have access when he bought the
property and did absolutely nothing to attempt to cure his access problems.
Capstar and its predecessors have simply sat on their hands. Just like they are doing in
regards to their lack of access across Section 28. There can be no doubt that the Lawrences'
predecessors, the Johnsons and McHughs, recognized that they did not have legal access across
Section 28. In 1977, they negotiated an access agreement with Idaho Forest Industries that
benefits the Lawrence parcel. They recognized the problem with their access and took the
necessary steps to fix it. To this day, no one in the Capstar chain of title has taken steps to correct
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this problem with their access. Using Capstar's logic, they wouldn't need to until such time as
their access gets cut-off. And, this gets to the heart of the latches defense. That Capstar and all its
predecessors, all had notice and the opportunity to assert their rights, but delayed in asserting
those rights until after the Lawrences purchase their property. Now, they assert claims that go
back 30 years or more and place the Lawrences at a disadvantage in defending the claim.
Capstar's claims are now stale and should be barred due to latches and the statues of limitations.

ROOKS SCAVENGER INFERENCE
During his deposition, Mr. Rook relived painful memories of how Capstar (Clear
Channel) [RD 45:14-15 R. 35120 v.2 pAll] ultimately came into ownership of the radio station
he built. He explained that deregulation enabled some broadcasters to ignore the FCC.
Companies like Clear Channel, who were not allowed to own more than six stations in a market,
would hire "lawyer friends" of theirs to buy up stations and hold them until they (Clear Channel)
could get federal approval. And, while on paper, it looked like the station was owned by someone
else, it was really being run by the giant broadcaster. [RD 42:4-43:2 R. 35120 v.2 pAll] Mr.
Rook just couldn't remember the name of these agreements that allowed broadcasters to run the
radio stations purchased by their "lawyer friends" without getting sued for fraud. See [RD 43:744:2]
JP Whelan: "Okay, so if I understand you correctly, somebody like AGM would
come in, and on paper it was owned by AGM, but essentially it was being
operated by Clear Channel?"
Rook: Oh, yeah [RD 43:3-7]
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It is terribly clear that Mr. Rook's bitterness is directed at Clear Channel. He offered

"When deregulation came along, giant companies with public money can come in and tell you,
'get the hell out of the water. We're taking your station. If you don't want to take the price we're
going to give you, we'll take it' and they did." [RD 20:20-25] When asked if Clear Channel was
one of those big companies with public money, his answer: "The biggest there is" [RD 21 :2522:2] There can be no doubt that Mr. Rook views Clear Channel, AGM, and Capstar, all as being
ultimately driven by the same individuals or the same controlling corporate structure. And, he
portrays this driving corporate entity as nothing less than a corporate bully.

ATTORNEY FEES
Capstar argues, that while the Lawrences did offer argument in their opening brief
relating to attorney fees, that attorney fees should not be awarded because the Lawrences either
did not cite case law in support of their argument or a statute in support of its motion. Capstar
then proceeds to cite Bream v. Benscoter, "This Court has repeatedly held it will not consider a
request for attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority or argument."
Lawrence's argument relating to attorney fees cannot be characterized as the same request
in Benscoter. In their brief, the Benscoters request for attorney fees on appeal consisted of one
brief sentence i.e. "Benscoter seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41." In
its ruling, this Court explained that Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not the authority for the awarding
of attorney fees on appeal. It simply provides, "Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must
assert a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party as
provided in Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." Those rules both provide that the party claiming
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attorney fees on appeal must include that claim as an issue or additional issue on appeal, and the
party must "state the basis for the claim." Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(6) and 35(b)(6) provide
that the argument portion of the brief must contain the contentions of the party "with respect to
the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and
parts of the transcript and record relied upon."
Rule 35 does not require that the party seeking attorney fees is required to cite a legal
authority in its opening brief. Rather, it simply provides that the party seeking attorney fees must
state the basis for the claim in their brief. Clearly, Benscoter's request for attorney fees was
deficient, not because they didn't cite a legal authority, but because they didn't offer any
argument in support. Our reading of this Court's ruling in Benscoter leaves us with a different
interpretation. That this Court will consider awards of attorney fees, provided the brief states the
basis for the claim. And, the Appellants opening brief does state the basis of the claim i.e. that
Capstar is using this litigation frivolously to pressure the Lawrences into acquiescing property
rights. And, that Capstar has interfered with the License agreements the Lawrences entered into
with Great Northern Broadcasting and Nextel, resulting in both agreements being breached.
As testified to by the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to
Summary Judgment, the Appellant did have a meeting with Kosta Panidis [R. 35120 v.2 p.160 ~'s
53 & 54], who identified himself to be the General Manager of Clear Channel and the owner of
the Capstar Tower Site. In that meeting, Mr. Panidis did concede to the Appellant that Clear
Channel did not have a legal access across the Lawrences' land. And, in a very arrogant and
condescending manner, only becoming of one who believes he holds all the power, told the
Appellant that "he didn't care." This fact is uncontroverted because Capstar has never denied Mr.
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Panidis making that statement and has never presented any rebuttal evidence to the contraryl.
They have remained totally quiet regarding the conversation between the Appellant and Kosta
Panidis.
In their reply brief, Capstar does not deny the Lawrences' allegations that Capstar
intentionally interfered with the license agreements they entered into with Capstar's tenant Great
Northern Broadcasting and Nextel. Their entire response to the charge is: "Regarding the claim
on the license agreement, while disputes with Capstar's tenant may have brought the matter to a
head, it is not frivolous to resort to a court of law for resolution of the dispute. " Clearly, this is

no denial, but rather, a rationale justifying their actions.
Mr. Lawrence's affidavit also testifies that Mr. Lawrence did discuss his intentions to
enter into a licensing agreement with Great Northern Broadcasting, directly with Kosta Panidis
prior to the execution of the license. Wiping his hands clean of the matter, Mr. Panidis told Mr.
Lawrence that it was up to his tenants to work out the access issues with us. At no time did Mr.
Panidis ever express any reservations or concerns. Quite to the contrary, he gave all appearances
of being both agreeable and quite supportive of the proposition.

lThe trial court had stricken the Appellants testimony (above the Appellants objections)
regarding this meeting as containing heresy. Neither Capstar, nor the trial court, identified which
part of the testimony contained heresy. Rather, the trial court simply had the whole paragraph
stricken. The Appellant's testimony in this matter was not heresy, but a first hand account of the
meeting he had with the General Manager of Clear Channel. It was improper for the trial court to
strike this testimony.
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The Great Norther Broadcasting license agreement provides terms for terminating the
license agreement. Those terms offered that the License may be terminated at any time upon the
giving of 30 days notice and providing that the Licensee vacates its interest in Blossom
Mountain. Similar to the Nextel agreement, Great Northern Broadcasting has not provided notice
that it intends to terminate the license agreement. Rather, it just quit making its monthly
payments as agreed to in the license agreement. [R. 35120 v.2 p. 161

~56]

The Lawrences had grown to rely on the income they were generating from the Nextel
and Great Northern Broadcasting license agreements. Capstar's intentional interference into these
license agreements was to induce further financial pressure on the Lawrences with the sole intent
of making a long and protracted litigation a very difficult proposition for the Lawrences to
defend. And, it worked. They made it such a costly proposition in the first few years, that the
Lawrences could no longer afford legal representation and had to take up a Pro Se stance.

CONCLUSION
Capstar is certainly willing to offer a share of the blame for this tediously, protracted
litigation on the Appellants by pointing to our enlargement of time to conduct discovery and J.P.
Whelan's premature appellate filing. Certainly, no one was more shocked than the two Pro Se
Appellants to discover that their appeal had been dismissed because their attorney (who
withdrew soon after) filed the appeal prematurely. The timing of the filing wasn't something
discussed. The Lawrences just assumed he knew what he was doing with their best interest at
heart. We're not attorneys and we can honestly claim ignorance.
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On the other hand, it seems terribly hard to imagine that the dismissal carne as a complete
surprise to Capstar's attorney. Ms. Weeks certainly wasn't under any obligation to point the defect
out so that the Pro Se Appellants could pursue their appeal. It's no fault of hers. But it does seem
somewhat disingenuous of her to accuse a couple of Pro Se Appellants for a delay that she really
could have prevented.
Ms. Weeks cautioned the Appellant Douglas Lawrence early in this lawsuit saying that

"This kind o/litigation could take years to wind its way through the courts." While Ms. Weeks
didn't pitch her statement as a threat, the inference was certainly unrnistakeable and undeniable.
After all, what other purpose could there possibly be for offering such a statement to a Pro Se
Defendant? Mr. Lawrence certainly didn't interpret it as an expression of genuine concern. It was
intended to be an ominous innuendo of what the Appellants should expect from this litigation, a
long, drawn out, and expensive affair.
At deposition, John Rook describes a very similar experience he had with Clear Channel.
When asked if they (Capstar) like to sue people and drag them into court and do all that sort of
thing? His answer: "They find a way to get what they want." Mr. Rook is speaking from his first
hand experience with Clear Channel. According to him, Clear Channel's attorneys made it
obviously clear, that if they were to loose the action he brought against them, they would just
appeal. "Because they said, we'll appeal even if we lose, and he'll be dead. He won't live through
it." [RD 44:14-16]
Capstar certainly found "a friend of the firm" in the district court and for nine years
benefited from the favoritism of the district court. Now, in front ofthis Court, they plead that
Capstar is not entitled to any less careful consideration because they are a corporation and their
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property rights are just as important as the Lawrences. Capstar never acted like the Lawrences'
rights were equal to theirs. Capstar didn't have any moral reservations in wrongfully enjoining
the Lawrences. Nor, did they have any reservations in trying to steal the Lawrences' property
rights or ruining the Lawrences' dream of raising their children on the 80 acres they purchased
specifically for that purpose. And, they certainly didn't have any reservations in financially and
emotionally squeezing the Lawrence family for more than nine years. Capstar intentionally
interfered with the license agreements the Lawrences made with Great Northern Broadcasting
and Nextel; and are principally responsible for those companies breaching those agreements.
And, there can be no doubt, that Capstar is the only party in this litigation that benefits from a
long and protracted litigation. The characterization that "this has been frustrating for them too"
simply reeks from the stench of mendacity.
Capstar didn't need to sue the Lawrences for access. The Lawrences were more than
willing to negotiate an arrangement with them. But, Capstar was to have no part of any
negotiation. They had decided, they were bigger; they had more money; and they had lawyers.
They could just make this litigation so costly and drag it on for so long that the Lawrences would
simply give in.
Capstar suggests that we're just playing to this Court's sympathies and passions. No, what
we are trying to do is to appeal to this Court's sense of justice. Big corporations simply should
not be allowed to use the judicial system to threaten and bully private citizens. Nor should big
corporations be allowed to use the judicial system as a financial and emotional vise, simply to
squeeze individuals into acquiescing their property rights. They do it because they can get away
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with it. Big corporations know it is a very difficult thing to prove and an even harder argument to
make, especially for untrained litigants.
Capstar simply believes that this Court will be more motivated to rule in their favor in an
effort to avoid creating a land-locked parcel, than ruling on the legal sufficiency oftheir theories.
What Capstar doesn't want this Court to consider is the fact that Capstar does not have a legal
access from the Lawrence parcel to the county road. It is undisputed that they do not have access
across Section 28. Granting Capstar access across the Lawrence parcel would not cure their lack
of access to the county road. The parcel will still be equally devoid of legal access.
We ask this Court to overturn the summary judgment and put a final end to their
complaint. We ask for an award of attorney fees. We also ask for an award of all fees, penalties,
damages, sanctions, and fines that the Idaho Supreme Court deems to be just, equitable, and
within the law and jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court to grant for: 1) Nine years of
wrongfully enjoining the Lawrences; 2) Nine years of trespass; 3) Wrongful interference in our
license agreements; 4) Nine years of denying the Lawrences their constitutional right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and 5) Irreparable harm to the Lawrences in denying them
their dream of raising their children on the property they purchased specifically for that purpose.
Respectfully submjtred,
/

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this / i day of August, 2011, I caused to be served two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Via:

US Mail, postage prepaid
X
_ _ Facsmile: (208) 664-1684
___ Personally served
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